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The Role of the Court in Shaping the Relationship
of the Individual to the State
The Canadian Supreme Court
by Professor Douglas A. Schmeiser*
T POSITION OF the individual as a focal point of judicial concern
did not substantially emerge in jurisprudence until after the Second
World War. In the late 1940's, revulsion to the excesses of the War, at
home and abroad, the establishment of the United Nations, and the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights combined to
arouse public concern for individual rights, and Courts mirrored that con-
cern. In the intervening thirty years the Canadian approach to individual
rights has varied considerably, and this paper will attempt to describe
how the Supreme Court of Canada views the position of the individual in
relation to the larger community, and the evolution of that position.
The conclusion to be drawn from examination of cases which follows
is that the Supreme Court of Canada no longer attaches primary impor-
tance to the role of the individual in conflict with the state. In the 1970's
there has been a sharp reversal of the Court's approach in the 1950's. The
Court today is more concerned with the collective good of society,
whether expressed in terms of needs of the State, administrative effi-
ciency, or law and order. This does not mean that the individual always
loses before the Court; it does mean that in case of doubt the common
good usually wins out over the individual good. It also means that the
main thrust for the protection of individual rights has come from the leg-
islatures, which generally have been more liberal than the courts.
In advancing this theme, reference will be made to leading cases in
the areas of administrative law, criminal law, evidence, the Canadian Bill
of Rights, and civil liberties. References to the opinion of the Court will
refer to the ruling of the majority. The cases selected are not exhaustive,
but have been carefully selected on the basis that they could easily have
been decided differently. They have usually been accompanied by very
strong dissents but no implication is intended that all of them were de-
cided wrongly.
In order to put the present position of the Court in perspective, ref-
erence to its earlier position is necessary. The 1950's were halcyon days
for the human iights advocate. In that period the Court was probably the
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most progressive court in the English speaking world. It was imaginative
and innovative. It did not have human rights legislation at its disposal to
protect individual rights. Armed only with the responsibility of dividing
legislative power between Parliament and the Provinces and with the de-
velopment of common law principles it took individual rights to an un-
dreamed of level in Canadian jurisprudence.
In Noble and Wolf v. Alley', the Court invalidated restrictive cove-
nants based on race because they were an unwarranted restriction on
alienation of land. In Boucher v. R.2 , the Court enunciated the most lib-
eral test for sedition ever adopted by a common law court, requiring an
intention to incite to rebellion. In Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd.3 , Jus-
tice Rand talked of the rights of a Canadian citizen, including the right to
work, to use the highways, and to travel. In Smith & Rhuland Ltd. v. R.4,
the Court denied the right of a provincial Labour Relations Board to re-
ject certification because the union was Communist dominated. In
Saumur v. City of Quebec5, the Court would not apply a municipal by-
law restricting the distribution of pamphlets on city streets without police
permission to religious pamphlets, and members of the Court talked of
an implied Bill of Rights because of constitutional provisions concerning
Parliament and denominational schools. In Henry Birks & Sons Ltd. v.
Montreal6 , the Court struck down a provincial statute authorizing munic-
ipal by-laws for the closing of stores on religious holidays. In Chaput v.
Romain7 and in Lamb v. Benoit8, the Court granted damages against po-
lice officers who had violated the religious rights of the plaintiffs, despite
statutory provisions absolving the police from liability. In Switzman v.
Elbling and A.G. Quebec", the Court struck down a provincial statute
making it illegal to use a house for the propagation of Communism. Jus-
tice Abbot expressed the view that Parliament itself could not pass such
legislation, and Justice Rand stated that "Liberty [of communication] is
little less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical
existence. As such an inherence in the individual it is embodied in his
status of citizenship."'' 0 In Roncarelli v. Duplessis", the Court awarded
damages against a provincial premier for the improper cancellation of an
annual liquor license, holding that there was no such thing as absolute or
untrammelled discretion in public regulation. In the area of criminal law,
the Court emphasized the mental requirement of a crime, ruling in a se-
( (1951] 1 D.L.R. 321.
2 [1951] 2 D.L.R. 369.
( 1951] 4 D.L.R. 529.
- [1953] 3 D.L.R. 690.
[1953] 4 D.L.R. 641.
6 [1955] 5 D.L.R. 321.
[1955] 1 D.L.R. 2d 241.
8 17 D.L.R. 2d 369 (1959).
7 D.L.R. 2d 337 (1957).
10 Id. at 358.
" 16 D.L.R. 2d 689 (1959).
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ries of cases that it would not convict someone of a criminal offence who
was operating under a mistake of fact."
This truly remarkable record was not to last. It waned in the 1960's,
and by the 1970's, protection of the individual no longer was a prime con-
cern of the Court. In the area of administrative law, the Court abandoned
the notion, espoused in Labour Relations Board of Sask. v. R. ex rel. F.
W. Woolworth Co."', that it would intervene in the operation of an ad-
ministrative board which was refusing to perform its duties, in favour of
the rule that a decision of an administrative tribunal acting within its
jurisdiction is not subject to judicial review, even though it involves an
error of fact or law. 4 It has held that revocation of parole is an adminis-
trative act and that the Parole Board is not bound to act judicially.1 5 It
also will not review a decision of the Inmate Disciplinary Board made
under the Penitentiary Act R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6, even though directives
issued by the Commissioner of Penitentiaries require the Board to act
judicially." Most recently, in Harelkin v. University of Regina17 , it re-
fused to quash a University committee decision expelling a student whom
it had not heard, despite a statutory obligation to do so, because there
was a further right of appeal to the Senate. The Court also expressed a
strong predisposition not to interfere with the running of University
affairs.
Subject to a few exceptions, the Supreme Court has had a very nega-
tive influence on the development of individual rights in criminal law. In
R. v. Carker, the Court" took a restrictive view of the defense of duress.
In Lemieux v. R. 19, the Court stated that the defense of entrapment did
not exist in Canada, but a later decision has called this into question.2 0 In
R. v. Biron,2 1 the Court ignored the clear words and symmetry of the
Criminal Code, holding that the power of a peace officer to arrest a per-
son found committing a criminal offence gives the right to arrest someone
"apparently" committing an offence. In R. v. Kundeus2 2 , the Court held
that belief that a less serious drug was being trafficked would not provide
" See R. v. Rees 4 D.L.R. 2d 406 (1956); Beaver v. R. (1957) S.C.R. 531; R. v. King 35
D.L.R. 2d 386 (1962).
13 [1955] 5 D.L.R. 607.
" See Farrell v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 31 D.L.R. 2d 177 (1961); Noranda
Mines Ltd. v. R., 7 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1969); Service Employees International Union v. Nipawin
District Staff Nurses Ass'n, 41 D.L.R. 3d 6 (1973).
" See Howarth v. National Parole Board, 50 D.L.R. 3d 391 (1974); Mitchell v. R., 61
D.L.R. 77 (1975).
" See Martineau and Butters v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board, 74
D.L.R. 3d 1 (1977).
17 26 N.R. 364, 3 W.W.R. 676 (1979).
18 [1967] S.C.R. 114, 2 C.R.N.S. 16.
18 63 D.L.R. 2d 75 (1967).
20 See R. v. Kirzner, 81 D.L.R. 3d 229 (1977).
31 59 D.L.R. 3d 409 (1975).
22 61 D.L.R. 3d 145 (1976).
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a defense. In Schwartz v. R.23, the Court ruled that an accused who knew
that an act was legally wrong would not qualify for the insanity defence
thereby rejecting a substantial body of Canadian law holding that the
word "wrong" meant "morally wrong." In Leary v. R. 24, the Court re-
stricted the defense of drunkenness to crimes of specific intent. In Rourke
v. R.15, the Court stated that the defence of abuse of process does not
exist in Canadian law. In Moore v. R.26, the Court convicted an accused of
the Criminal Code offence of wilfully obstructing a peace officer, after he
had infringed a minor municipal by-law and would not identify himself to
the police, even though there was no duty on the accused to identify him-
self. In R. v. Guimond2 7 , the Court restricted the defence of inconsistent
verdicts by holding that when two alleged co-conspirators are tried sepa-
rately, the acquittal of one co-conspirator does not necessarily invalidate
the conviction of the other.
On the positive side, the Court has fashioned a rule against multiple
convictions for the same matter, not merely the same offence, out of the
aegis of the doctrine of res judicata28 It has created a three-tiered classi-
fication of offences where mistake of fact has occurred, establishing a cat-
egory of strict liability regulatory offences where the accused may avoid
liability by proving that he took reasonable care. 9 The Court has con-
verted what was essentially a mistake of law into a mistake of fact, giving
a defense to someone charged with driving while disqualified when he did
not know of a law which automatically suspended his license. 30 This year,
in a decision uncharacteristic of Biron and Moore, the Court granted
damages for a false arrest by a police officer, ruling that for a policeman
to have reasonable grounds for believing someone has committed an of-
fence, his belief must take into account all the information available to
him.31
The evidence cases are even more restrictive of individual rights. In
DeClerq v. R.32, the Court held that on a voir dire to determine the volun-
tariness of an accused's statement, the accused may be asked if the state-
ment- is tiue. In R. v. Wray 3 , the Court ruled that evidence obtained as a
result of an involuntary confession is admissible and that generally a trial
judge does not have discretion to exclude unimpeachable evidence even
though it has been unfairly obtained. In Hogan v. R.34 , it was held that
23 67 D.L.R. 3d 716 (1976).
2, 74 D.L.R. 3d 103 (1977).
25 76 D.L.R. 3d 193 (1977).
28 90 D.L.R. 3d 112 (1978).
27 8 C.R. 3d 185 (1979).
28 Kienapple v. R., 44 D.L.R. 3d 351 (1974).
" R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 85 D.L.R. 3d 161 (1978).
20 R. v. Prue; R. v. Baril, 8 C.R. 3d 68 (1978).
32 Chartier v. A.G. Quebec, 27 N.R. 1 (1979).
32 70 D.L.R. 2d 530 (1968).
33 11 D.L.R. 3d 673 (1970).
.4 48 D.L.R. 3d 427 (1975).
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evidence obtained in violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights is admissi-
ble. Faber v. R.35, held that a person suspected of murder, but not yet
charged, can be forced to testify at a coroner's inquest. This decision was
rendered in spite of the earlier decision in Batary v. A.G. for Sask.,
holding that a person charged with murder is not a compellable witness
at a coroner's inquest. Morris v. R. (1978) 3, upheld the cross-examination
of an accused on his juvenile record, even though the Juvenile Delin-
quents Act R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3, provides that the trial of a juvenile shall
take place without publicity and that no report shall be published of a
delinquency committed by a child. Such cross-examination is, however,
only for the purpose of attacking credibility. A series of cases have also
permitted the prosecution easy admissiblity of similar fact evidence.3 8
The only respite from this dour list of cases is a group of cases applying
the rule that no statement made by an accused to a person in authority is
admissible unless its voluntariness is proven.39
The Canadian Bill of Rights R.S.C. 1970, App. III, was first adopted
on August 10th, 1960. It is a legislative document, not a constitutional
document, but decisions subsequent to its enactment have not turned on
this distinction. Only one decision of the Supreme Court has attached
fundamental importance to the Bill. R. v. Drybones40, held that special
liquor offences for Indians were inconsistent with the Canadian Bill of
Rights and that a law inconsistent with the Bill was inoperative. Justice
Ritchie stated that "an individual is denied equality before the law if it is
made an offence punishable at law, on account of his race, for him to do
something which his fellow Canadians are free to do without having com-
mitted any offence or having been made subject to any penalty."'1
The practical effect of the Drybones decision was mitigated by the
later decision of the Court in A.G. Canada v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard.42
Section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, provides that a
woman who marries a non-Indian loses her status as an Indian; the Act
contains no similar disqualification for a man. The Court held that this
provision did not violate the guarantee against sexual discrimination con-
tained in the Bill of Rights, and adopted a very narrow attitude toward
the construction and application of the Bill. On the question of the gen-
eral approach to the Bill, Justice Ritchie stated:
What is at issue here is whether the Bill of Rights is to be construed
as rendering inoperative one of the conditions imposed by Parliament for
31 65 D.L.R. 3d 423 (1975).
-6 52 D.L.R. 2d 125 (1965).
37 6 C.R. 3d 36 (1978).
38 See Leblanc v. P., 68 D.L.R. 3d 242 (1975); Alward and Mooney v. R., 76 D.L.R. 3d
577 (1977); Hewson v. R., 5 C.R. 3d 155 (1978); Guay v. R., 6 C.R. 3d 130 (1978).
3 See Erven v. R., 92 D.L.R. 3d 507 (1978); Horvath v. R., 93 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1979); Ward
v. R., 94 D.L.R. 3d 18 (1979).
4. 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1969).
"1 Id. at 484.
42 38 D.L.R. 3d 481 (1973).
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the use and occupation of Crown lands reserved for Indians. These con-
ditions were imposed as a necessary part of the structure created by Par-
liament for the internal administration of the life of Indians on reserves
and their entitlement to the use and benefit of Crown lands situate
thereon, they were thus imposed in discharge of Parliament's constitu-
tional function under s. 91(24) and in my view can only be changed by
plain statutory language expressly enacted for the purpose. It does not
appear to me that Parliament can be taken to have made or intended to
make such a change by the use of broad general language directed at the
statutory proclamation of the fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed
by all Canadians, and I am therefore of opinion that the Bill of Rights
had no such effect.'
3
Development of the meaning of the Bill was frowned on in the following
conclusion:
In my view the meaning to be given to the language employed in the
Bill of Rights is the meaning which it bore in Canada at the time when
the Bill was enacted, and it follows that the phrase "equality before the
law" is to be construed in light of the law existing in Canada at that
time."
The phrase "equality before the law" was denuded of substantive content
when the Court stated:
In considering the meaning to be attached to "equality before the
law" as those words occur in s. 1(b) of the Bill, I think it important to
point out that in my opinion this phrase is not effective to invoke the
egalitarian concept exemplified by the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution as interpreted by the Courts of that country: see R. v. Smythe
(1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 480, 3 C.C.C. (2d) 366, [1971] S.C.R. 680 per
Fauteux, C.J.C. at pp. 482 and 484-5. I think rather that, having regard
to the language employed in the second paragraph of the preamble to the
Bill of Rights, the phrase "equality before the law" as used in s. 1 is to be
read in its context as part of "the rule of law" to which overriding au-
thority is accorded by the terms of that paragraph.
In my opinion the phrase "equality before the law" as employed in s.
1(b) of the Bill of Rights is to be treated as meaning equality in the
administration or application of the law by the law enforcement authori-
ties and the ordinary Courts of the land. This construction is, in my
view, supported by the provisions of paras. (a) to (g) of s. 2 of the Bill
which clearly indicate to me that it was equality in the administration
and enforcement of the law with which Parliament was concerned when
it guaranteed the continued existence of "equality before the law".'
The Bill of Rights was also utilized in Brownridge v. R.,46 where the
43 Id. at 490.
44 Id. at 494.
45 Id. at 494-95.
-6 28 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1972).
[Vol. 3:67
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accused was charged with failing, without reasonable excuse, to provide
upon demand a sample of his breath for analysis. The accused had been
denied the opportunity to speak to his lawyer to determine whether he
had to comply with the demand, and the Court held that this was a rea-
sonable excuse for failing to comply.
In other decisions concerning the Bill of Rights the Court has held
that the Bill does not render inoperative the Lord's Day Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. L-13 7 ; that the denial by police to an accused of his right to retain and
instruct counsel without delay cannot nullify the subsequent proceed-
ings48 and that evidence obtained in violation of the Bill is still
admissible.4
9
In the area of civil liberties, the Court has substantially extended the
rules of standing to allow constitutional challenges of legislation. Thorson
v. A.G. Canada (No. 2) ,5 0 held that where all members of the public are
equally affected by legislation and no person or class of persons has any
special interest in the matter and where the legislation is not regulatory
but declaratory and creates no offences, but does involve the expenditure
of public money, the Court has discretion to permit a taxpayer to test the
validity of the legislation, particularly where the federal Attorney General
has refused to bring action. Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. Mc-
Neil,51 extended the Thorson rules to allow private challenge of regu-
latory provincial legislation (in this case, movie censorship legislation)
where the legislation directly affects members of the public and there
are no other practical means of testing its constitutionality, even though
certain business enterprises are more directly affected than the public.
Where action has once been brought, however, the claim of alleged
violation of rights has usually been denied. Walter and Fletcher v. A.G.
Alberta,5 2 upheld a provincial statute restricting the acquisition of land as
communal property and specifically referring to Hutterites, on the basis
that the legislation was property legislation and did not interfere with
religious freedom. Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil" held
that a provincial censorship board may establish and enforce a local stan-
dard of morality despite federal jurisdiction over criminal law. It further
held that the question of the validity of provincial legislation is to be
approached on the assumption that it is validly enacted, even though it is
couched in very -eneral terms. A.G. Canada v. Dupond", laid to rest the
notion of an implied Bill of Rights in our Constitution. The Court upheld
a municipal by-law prohibiting all assemblies, parades and gatherings on
47 Robertson and Rosetanni v. R., 41 D.L.R. 2d 485 (1962).
48 O'Connor v. R., 51 D.L.R. 2d 123 (1966).
49 Hogan v. R., 48 D.L.R. 3d 427 (1974).
80 43 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1974).
61 55 D.L.R. 3d 632 (1975).
52 3 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1969).
83 84 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1978).
84 D.L.R. 3d 420 (1978).
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city property for a period of thirty days. In the course of judgment, Jus-
tice Beetz stated:
1. None of the [fundamental] freedoms is so enshrined in the Con-
stitution as to be above the reach of competent legislation.
2. None of those freedoms is a single matter coming within exclu-
sive federal or provincial competence. Each of them is an aggregate of
several matters which, depending on the aspect, come within federal or
provincial competence.
3. Freedoms of speech, of assembly and association, of the press
and of religion are distinct and independent of the faculty of holding
assemblies, parades, gatherings, demonstrations or processions on the
public domain of a city . . . . Demonstrations are not a form of speech
but of collective action. They are of the nature of a display of force
rather than of that of an appeal to reason; their inarticulateness prevents
them from becoming part of language and from reaching the level of
discourse.
4. The right to hold public meetings on a highway or in a park is
unknown to English law. Far from being the object of a right, the holding
of a public meeting on a street or in a park may constitute a trespass
against the urban authority in whom the ownership of the street is
vested even though no one is obstructed and no injury is done; it may
also amount to a nuisance.55
Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun," involved the
Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd sess.), c. 119,
which prohibits the denial of any service customarily available to the
public unless reasonable cause exists for such denial. A newspaper which
reserved the right to control the content of classified advertising refused
to accept a classified advertisement for a homosexual publication. A
Board of Inquiry established under the Code found that bias against
homosexuals was not a reasonable cause for refusal, but the Supreme
Court upheld the reversal of the Board's ruling.
What, then, can we learn from this brief survey of Supreme Court
decisions? Certainly the individualistic, sympathetic and imaginative ap-
proach to human rights problems of the 1950's has given way to a genera-
lized and mechanical approach today. Certainly the Court is more con-
cerned about public power and orderly administration than it is about
individual claims of rights. The same trends are found in all areas of pub-
lic law.
Explanations for the change vary. Some suggest the radicalism of the
1960's, other suggest declining economic expectations, still others suggest
the exaggerated emphasis on rights and the neglected emphasis on re-
sponsibilities. On occasion lawyers have been at fault: often the cases
where human rights issues were raised were bad cases and were the last
refuge of a hopeless defence. This survey has only attempted to chronicle
the fact of change; the explanation for that change must be left to others.
Let me end with an apology. It would have been very comforting for
5 Id. at 439.
5- 27 N.R. 117 (1979).
[Vol. 3:67
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me to praise the Canadian Supreme Court in a foreign setting, but intel-
lectual honesty makes that impossible. Liberty is no less prized in Ca-
nada. I often think that in many areas it is more prized and more effec-
tively achieved in Canada than it is in the United States.
For example, many of the things which Mr. Justice Mosk described
as ideal do in fact exist in Canada. What one must understand, however,
is that the role of the legislature and the role of the courts are different in
Canada. Often the legislatures have corrected the excessive conservatism
of the Court.
If I were to describe the Canadian situation by way of an illustration
I would suggest that an idealistic picture of the Canadian situation would
be the courts and the legislatures walking hand in hand towards the com-
mon goal of human rights. In that walk unfortunately our courts are pres-
ently lagging behind.
9
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